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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine how well the countries in the Western
Hemisphere translate Organization of American States’ (OAS) resolutions into actual
meaningful legislation, and how international discourse influences, or does not, domestic
policy. This study will utilize the data program QDA Miner in order to better analyze
texts of agreements and treaties put forth by the OAS, and to highlight the correlation
between different types of rhetoric and meaningful member state action. Data will be
gathered primarily from the OAS’ own data bases and compiled into the QDA software
for analysis. This analysis will allow the agreements to be divided into “rhetoric
categories.”
After the agreements are analyzed and divided up into their respective rhetoric
categories, regression will be run using SPSS 19.1 IBM software. This software will
allow for the interpretation of whether or not there is a correlation between competing
types of international discourse and the domestic policies of member states.
Prior to this study, many different research studies have been carried out to
examine what compels different countries act in accordance with International
Organizations and what does not. Compliance with international declarations and
agreements has long since been a question and focal point of study when analyzing
international institutions and this study aims to understand what role, if any, language and
rhetoric plays in the issue of compliance.

From Force to Forceful Language: A Review of the Literature

The question of compliance has long since been a puzzle for scholars of
international relations and international organizations. International institutions are
structures that aim to unify and organize a group, or groups of countries1. These
institutions are formed on a voluntary basis, and this is where the trouble the starts2. If an
institution is comprised of voluntary members, then how can a resolution-writing
assembly, even a centralized one, get member nations to comply with declarations and
agreements? There are two major competing theories that seek to explain compliance
with international declarations and agreements: 1) the collective goods theory; and, 2) the
fear of being the outsider theory. This portion of the study will aim to examine them and
offer another possible explanatory theory, namely the rhetorical approach.
From a structural standpoint, money makes the institution. An institution can
expect no action if it does not have a budget. If an institution is created on voluntary
membership, then its budget, too, must be created on voluntary payments. While
payments may be optional and non-desirable for member states, the reception of
collective goods and benefits from the institution is desirable3.

1

Bennett, p 34
Bennett, p. 41. According to Bennett, the voluntary aspect of international organizations
represents both a positive and a negative aspect. On the positive side, the voluntary nature
of the international organizations allows member states to join freely and not feel as
though they are giving up sovereignty to do so. On the negative side, since they are
voluntary, action is sometimes limited and the organizations must be tread lightly when
making decisions, as it could result in a loss of members.
3
Larsen-Freeman, p. 48. In a perfect scenario for any member country, payment would
not be necessary. If a country chooses not to pay, however, the overall budget of the
organization goes down – and the collective goods within the organization, too, plummet.
2

One of the most alluring features of any group, from the local, regional, national
levels to the international levels, are the collective goods that the group can provide. One
way that any institution seeks to attract membership is to show potential members that the
overall good of the group would be greater, if each individual member provided to the
group as a whole. 4 Any member that joins the group, so long as they follow the rules of
the group and participate in the group’ affairs, can benefit from the group’s collective
goods5. In order to gain anything from a group, one must put in to the group – a simple
give and take, but you cannot have one without the other.
This theory is relatively simple in its logic: if a country becomes a member of an
institution and follows the bylaws of that institution, that country seeks to gain all the
benefits that the institution has to offer6. This simple logic has been analyzed and used to
explain member state’s compliance with institutional declarations and agreements for
decades. It relies on “rational behavior” and the idea of “collective conceptualization”
from all member states. 7Member states, if they are rational actors, would join these
institutions in order to receive countless benefits and collective goods ranging from but

4

Gowa, p.12. The collective goods of any organization naturally augment if more
members that are willing to contribute join.
5
Gowa, p.13. This is an important point that ties back to Bennett’s discussion of
voluntary. As Bennett pointed out, membership (and all that comes along with
membership, e.g. following the rules) is voluntary. Gowa points out, however, that the
only way a member state will benefit from the collective good is if that member state
abides by the rules of the organization. If a member state, for example, joined an
organization, but did not contribute and did not ever follow the rules of that organization,
that member state could not expect to benefit from the collective goods.
6
It must be noted that this logic is based off the assumption that other member states will
also abide by the same set of rules, following the same logic.
7
Riggins, p.xxii

not limited to, “collective security, increased technological advancements & trade
markets.”8
Based on this theory, there can be power in numbers. Assuming that participating
member states actually aim to positively contribute to the group, then it is better to work
in conjunction with other member states than to rely solely on the brainpower, manpower
and economic power of your own member state. “Higher levels of performance” can only
emerge from “cooperation and constant partnership” between member states9. For
example, the United States, based on this theory, would be better off joining an institution
that offered discounts on oil, since it does not have enough oil to sustain itself10. Many
small and recently formed European states find themselves joining Western European
alliance coalitions to “offset and reduce costs of telecommunications, a good which is
needed but difficult for new nations to produce.”11 And the same can be seen in Latin
America, with many smaller nations joining the Organization of American States to

8

Weymann, chp. 6. Collective goods can be small or large, they can be simple or
complicated; each collective good is unique. In order to get any of the collective goods,
large or small, a member state must first act in accordance with the organization. To do
so requires, as Weymann points out, rational action.
9
Lee, p.2. As member states begin to interact with each other, whether that be multilaterally or bi-laterally, greater productivity can be the result. Cooperation is often a way
to increase output.
10
Kapur, 1995. It makes sense logically for a country to go outside of its borders to get a
good or service that it does not have on its own.
11
Sandholtz, p.91. It can be seen from this example that some goods, while desirable, are
difficult for small and developing nations to attain. In these cases, it is smartest for
smaller countries to join international organizations and agreements to get the goods that
they cannot get on their own.

partake in treaties and security alliances to protect themselves from the “threat of piracy
and intervention.”12
All across the globe, collective goods serve to be a major reason why countries
join institutions and organizations. But it is not enough to merely join the organization. In
order to receive the benefits, a member country must follow the bylaws and declarations
of the organization.
The collective goods and benefits theory casts a rationalist light on international
politics and makes the assumption that all members are rational and self-serving. Based
on this theory, it would be unlikely that a member country would follow a declaration or
agreement without the promise of some collective good.
Another competing theory is centered on the “fear of being the outsider.”13 Rather
than complying with agreements and declarations to receive collective goods, this school
of thought suggests that member countries comply with agreements and declarations to
avoid being perceived as the outsider or rebel within an organization.14 In other words,
member states comply to uphold the organizational norms.
International institutions have an “innate and general propensity” for states “to
comply with international treatises, declarations and agreements.”15 The analogy is like a

12

Foran, p.147. Foran suggests that smaller and lesser developed countries often coalesce
because the power that they can amass in a group is much greater than the power they
could produce unilaterally.
13
Haas, 1997
14
Haas, 1997. Transparency is a major tool that international organizations use to get
countries to comply with treaties and agreements. Within the structures of many
international organizations, the actions of all member states are visible. If, for example,
one member country is blatantly ignoring a declaration, all member countries have easy
access to this information. If a country is constantly seen as disregarding agreements and
declarations, this country becomes vulnerable within the group.
15
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, p.84

game with a set of players. Each player must follow the rules, and negligence is
transparent. For this reason, if a member country (or player) does not follow a declaration
or agreement (or breaks the rules), all other member countries will see and therefore
judge the delinquent member country,16 or worse, impose isolation or excess trade costs
on the delinquent member country.
Member countries feel a pressure to conform and comply with international
institution’s agreements and declarations simply to avoid the chastisement of other
member states. J Harrop, author of Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International
Organizations, compares the situation to being bullied in the schoolyard. The
international institution is the bully, so to speak, and the member countries are fellow
classmates who comply to avoid the wrath of the older bully. And true to the playground
analogy, other member countries (or classmates), often team up with the bully, even if
they do not really believe in what the bully is doing or saying, leaving those who openly
go against the grain susceptible to being socially ostracized from the group.17
Both schools of thought are logically sound and straightforward. Both offer
insight into the pivotal question of why states act in accordance with an international
institution’s declarations and agreements, yet neither can fully explain the phenomena. A
third school of thought, which has yet to be fully assessed, is the rhetorical approach and
the power of language. Language is defined as any means of communication, verbal or
written, that allows two or more people or groups of people to interact with one and

16

Fang, p.13. This compliments Haas’ theory of transparency and the fear of being the
outsider.
17
Harrop, pp.152-159.

other18. Language is what allows the declarations and agreements to be communicated,
and without language these documents would not be created. Even with this knowledge,
however, many are quick to overlook the careful language that is put into each agreement
and declaration.
It is no mistake that diplomats and legislative bodies spend countless hours and
efforts to choose each word in every agreement and declaration put forth. The reason for
this is as clear as the logic in the aforementioned schools of thought. Language has power
and influence to frame issues and debates, to shift the nuanced connotations of words,
and to reflect the strength of societal and regional norms. If something is worded to
strongly, it could be mistaken as offensive19. Conversely, if something is worded to
ambiguously or weakly, it could be ignored and not taken seriously20. There is a fine line
between aggressive and passive language, and when it comes to compliance, the line
must be respected.
The psychological power of language can be just as important as the political
environment of any given institution21. The two most important facets of good diplomatic
language that will produce compliance are clarity and tone.
Any document, which seeks to gain compliance, must obviously be clear. If a
piece is not clear, and member states do not understand what is being asked of them, the

18

Conley, p.17
Thornborrow, p. 32
20
Thornborrow, p.34
21
Kitzinger, p. 38. Kitzinger argues that language has a truly dynamic power. It has the
power to shift and mold beliefs. Language can both inspire people and turn people away
from any particular cause. A positive outcome could seem negative with the proper
wording, and the converse can also be true. Language really does have the power to call
for action.
19

hope that they will comply is zero. It can be assumed, for the purpose of this paper, that
any document that has become an official declaration or agreement is clear.
Tone is perhaps the most important part of any written or verbal declaration.
Aggressive language that is too harsh will immediately produce feelings of hostility22.
Aggressive language can be defined as language with but not limited to “profanity, direct
threats, excessive mandates, condescending wording, excessive informal pronoun usage,
and extremely rigid and unattainable time frames.23” Aggressive language, though
unhelpful when it comes to international diplomacy, is often used by authority figures
that feel strongly about accomplishing a certain goal, or feel strongly that one member
needs to somehow be reprimanded.24 The thought behind this tactic is logical – an angry
tone will send a serious and powerful message. Powerful language asserts power, right?
In the case of international institutions and achieving solidarity and collective
action amongst member states, there is a “certain paradox” that collective action “poses
for individual member states and central bodies of power.”25 In many cases, an authority
figure is advised to use aggressive language. Think for example, to the captain of a sports
team. When his or her team is playing poorly, or he needs to rally them up for a big
game, aggressive language is most always used. It has a way of inciting players to act.

22

Kitzinger, p. 51. This is true across all levels of the spectrum from personal interaction
to international level interaction. A message that is worded aggressively has an innate
ability to deter the listener (whether that be a person, or a country).
23
Giles, 1987
24
Giles, 1987. This can be analogous to a parent and a child. Often times when a child
misbehaves a parent feels it necessary to scold the child. Although this can sometimes
have the reverse effect, the parent often believes that scolding the child will mold that
child into behaving a certain way.
25
Donnellon, p. 19

The dynamic in an international institution, however, is vastly different.26 There is, as
Donnellon suggests, less of a need to be incited (or fired up so to speak), and more of a
need to be coaxed into acting.27
Persuasive language, therefore, is the best way to get member states to act in
accordance with agreements and declarations. Persuasive language is language that
“poses a solution rather than just focusing on a problem” and “asserts that this solution is
the best solution.”28 Persuasive language by no means poses a threat to any member state,
but rather highlights the importance of action29. Persuasive language sets out to create a
“collective and solidified identity” amongst member states and subtly puts pressure on
each member state to act - without each member state’s cooperation, the goal has no way
of being accomplished.
As opposed to aggressive language, persuasive language often carries more of an
encouraging connotation. It aims to encourage member states to act, rather than forcing
them to do so. A gentle prod, rather than a forceful shove.
Although none would deny the importance of language in the creation of
agreements and declarations, detailed research into the effects of language on compliance
26

Because it is cooperative collective action where the benefit is derived through
cooperating with other sides, whereas the sports team derives benefits through collective
action to defeat the other team. In other words, there is an in group and out group that
requires them to cooperate with each other in order to compete with/ destroy the other
group (similar to a military organization, but different from an institution where there is
no other to destroy (or doing so would actually deprive them of the benefits of the
organization).
27
Donnellon, p.25. International organizations and member states are different from
sports teams and players because of diplomacy. Sports teams are very aggressive and
competitive, and while international organizations and member states can also have those
qualities, the latter is done so in a politically correct and proper arena.
28
Kitzinger, p.71
29
Kitzinger, p. 73. This type of language offers incentives and emphasizes the positive
results of acting, rather than threatening the negative results of disobeying.

and cooperation has yet to be carried out in full. This study aims to examine whether or
not language plays a role in getting member states to act on the agreements and
declarations that they have signed on to within international institutions that they have
joined – specifically the Organization of American States (OAS).

Contributions of This Research

This research seeks to understand the relationship, if any, between the careful use
of language within treaties and agreements put forth by international organizations, and
the impact that it has on domestic policy making by member states to implement these
agreements. For many years research has been carried out to show the effects of
collective goods and a desire to obtain a group mentality. Previous research has shown
that these theories do have an effect on a member state’s policy-making choices.
Research on language and the power of linguistic choices, however, has not yet been
carried out.
For this reason, this paper will offer an alternative approach: the power of
language.

Hypothesis

H1: The more aggressive the language is in an OAS declaration or agreement; the
less likely countries will be to act in accordance with the declaration or agreement.

*The converse of this hypothesis would state: The more persuasive the
language is in an OAS declaration or agreement; the more likely countries
will be to act in accordance with the declaration or agreement.

The central hypothesis aims to examine the effect that different types of rhetoric
have on member state action within the context of the Organization of American States.
A criticism of many international organizations is that agreements and declarations
offered by the organizations are seldom put into practice30.
Within the Organization of American States consensus is required for resolutions
to be passed and put into effect. Declarations and agreements within the Organization of
American States, however, are unique in that they do not require consensus. For this
reason, declarations and agreements were selected as a helpful unit of analysis, since they
offer the most variance in terms of signatories and member-state action.
The effects of language have been studied for quite some time, yet quantative
analysis on the effects of language on decision and policy making is marginal. For this
reason the hypothesis was selected to serve as a means of studying the effects that the
language within declarations and agreements, has on producing meaningful member-state
action.

Methodology

30

Coicaud, Jean- Marc, p. 2. Discusses the “legitimacy deficit” and explains the major
challenge with International Organizations, since their foundations (the majority of which
were founded 50 years ago), to be getting state governments to act in accordance with the
wishes of the people and the international organizations. In other words, according with
Coicaud, the major challenge is getting states not to act autonomously.

This paper will utilize QDA Miner 19.1, word-analyzing software. The software
has the capability of analyzing the impact of certain words and/or phrase throughout a
database of speeches, pieces of legislation, or any word-document. For this reason, all of
the documents uploaded into the software had to be compiled manually – leaving some
room for subjectivity.
This study will use declarations and agreements put forth by the OAS over three
decades. Each declaration and agreement once uploaded into the QDA Miner 19.1
software will then be analyzed to examine how “aggressive” the text is. Aggressiveness
of a text will be determined by assessing the number of aggressive words that exist within
the declaration or agreement (this assessment will be traced using the QDA Miner 19.1
Software). Target words of aggression, which were selected based on Chapter 16, entitled
“Signaling and Perception,” written by Richard Jervis (Columbia University), within the
book Political Psychology, by Kristen R. Monroe. The following words were targeted
within the QDA Miner 19.1 Software and traced throughout the declarations and
agreements being analyzed: ‘mandates,’ ‘requires,’ ‘condemns,’ ‘detests,’ ‘dictates,’
‘orders,’ and ‘censures.’ The number of times these target words appear within each
declaration or agreement will be recorded and put into an SPSS database. This
information will serve as the independent variable for this study.
Once compiled, the results of each declaration or agreement will be analyzed for
each member country. Two factors for analysis will be used, utilizing SPSS software: 1)
what percent of member countries signed onto the agreement or declaration? A
percentage was required to ensure that the analysis was at the interval/ratio level of

analysis, which is necessary in order to run regression analysis and to obtain the Pearson
R Correlation value. A percentage was obtained by manually dividing the number of
cosignatories by the total number of member states (35) within the Organization of
American States. The information available for this variable was obtained from the OAS
Archives on agreements and declarations. 2) What was the total number of specific
legislative or policy-related action carried out with the purpose of supporting the
declaration or agreement? This data was obtained from within the OAS website, as well
as the government websites of various member countries. The data compiled for these
two variables were then entered into the same SPSS database as the “target words” data.
The conjunction of these two factors will serve as the dependent variable for this study.
Two factors will be used because merely signing on to an agreement or
declaration is not enough and does not ensure that a country actually intends to follow
through with what it has signed on to. Historically, it is not uncommon for a country to
sign on to a declaration and then do nothing more. It is necessary, but not sufficient to
prove that a member country is acting in accordance with the declaration or agreement.
All data for this study was collected manually and the references for the data
portion of this study are highlighted in bold face font in the references section.

Data and Findings:
Since all three variables were obtained at the interval/ratio level of analysis,
regression analysis could be run on the dataset. The data set is comprised of twenty
different agreements and declarations from over forty years. The actions of all thirty-five

member-countries were included for each of the twenty agreements and declarations. The
following data was produced when regression analysis was run:

Dependent Variable 1: Percent of Signatories:

Correlations

Pearson Correlation
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The above graphics provide the data that was gathered from the regression
analysis. The analysis shows a positive correlation at the 0.001 level of significance,
meaning that there is a strong and highly significant relationship between the independent
and dependent variable in question. It is also important to note that the dataset is
complete and there are no missing pieces of data, as shown by the “Correlation Graphic,”
under the N section which shows “20” for all cells.

.000

From the correlation analysis it is clear that there is a strong, positive relationship
between the type of language used and the percentage of signatories for each declaration
and agreement being analyzed.
The model summary, however, shows the most significant findings. The Adjusted
R Square produced a value of 0.594, meaning that 59.4% of the variance of why member
states sign onto agreements or declarations can be explained based on the type of
language.
Although this does not explain 100% of the variance, 59.4% is a rather-large
portion, meaning that the empirical data strongly supports the hypothesized relationship.

Dependent Variable 2: Number of Member State Actions:

Correlations

Pearson Correlation
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The above graphics provide the data that was gathered from the regression
analysis. The analysis shows a positive correlation at the 0.05 level of significance,
meaning that there is a significant relationship between the independent and dependent
variable in question. It is also important to note that the dataset is complete and there are
no missing pieces of data, as shown by the “Correlation Graphic,” under the N section
which shows “20” for all cells.
From the correlation analysis it is clear that there is a positive relationship
between the type of language used in the declarations being analyzed and the number of
concrete actions taken by member states to implement the declarations. Although the
correlation is not as strong as the correlation between the type of language and the
percent of signatories, there is still a significant and positive correlation nonetheless.
The model summary, however, shows the most significant findings. The Adjusted
R Square produced a value of 0.236, meaning that 23.6% of the variance of why member
states sign onto agreements or declarations can be explained based on the type of
language.
Although this does not explain 100% of the variance, 23.6% is a substantial
portion, meaning that the hypothesized relationship is again supported.

Discussion and Conclusions:

Both of the relationships analyzed produced significant results in terms of
explaining why member states sign and act to implement agreements and declarations put
forth by the Organization of American States.
The research shows that one reason why member states sign onto agreements or
the type of language could explain declarations that an agreement or declaration contains.
Other factors, such as voting blocs, regional alliances, or domestic policies also play a
factor, but this study has provided information and data showing that language and
rhetoric also plays a sizeable role in getting member states to sign onto agreements and
declarations at the very least.
For this reason alone this research is invaluable. Member states and international
organization agreement-writing personnel should carefully consider the findings of this
research. It is evident, based on this research that rhetoric certainly has an effect on
member countries signing onto agreements and declarations, and therefore should be
considered carefully. Literature suggests that aggressive language is often sought out in
order to bring precedence to certain issues and to highlight importance. This research,
however, should serve as a precautionary tool for any member state or organization
wishing to pursue this avenue in hopes of getting member-state concordance.
It must be noted, however, that the type of language explained the percentage of
signatories dependent variable more than it explained the concrete actions taken variable.
There are two possible explanations for this finding. First, that member states rarely carry
out domestic policies pertaining to agreements and declarations, leaving little room for
language to play an important factor in determining when to act and when not to act.
Second, that there are external factors compelling member states to act.

The latter explanation leaves room for further research and examination. There
are several factors identified in the literature review carried out for this study that could
be further analyzed, but were not in this particular paper given the fact that they were out
of the scope of this research.
The first could be political alliances. Political alliances are present within every
organization from the local, to state, to national, to international level. Alliances are part
of politics as coalitions and groups always form. For this reason, research would suggest
that analyzing the effects of political alliances on getting member states to act would be
beneficial, and could perhaps produce more significant results.
The second could be the political atmosphere. Time was accounted into this study
in terms of elapsed time; it was not, however, analyzed contextually. In other words,
different time periods produce different political environments. Perhaps a certain decade
gave way to increased legislative action within the region. On the other hand, a different
decade could have been more cautionary and/or lethargic in terms of domestic policies.
For this reason, contextualizing time and adding it into the study could be of critical
importance for further research.
The third and final alternative avenue of research could be the economic and
budgetary environment. This research highlighted the power of the purse as a means of
solidifying collective goods, but it did not examine the power of the purse as a restrictive
or permissive factor in domestic politics. Recession, and its counterpart, growth, has
enormously different effects on domestic policies and government programs. For this
reason, if each member countries budget and economic standing could be operationalized
and then assessed, it too could serve as a crucial variable for the research.

Even without analyzing these three, or additional, variables, the current paper has
lent significant empirical support to the argument that rhetoric matters in international
organizations, and in the impact of international agreements on domestic politics. Words
that are written down, though they can be altered, frame arguments and have lasting
effects on the policies that are created and the agreements and declarations that are
supported. Though word choice and rhetorical strength are not exclusively used as
deciding factors, none can deny the significance of language.
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